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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact that ownership structure has on the pay-performance 
relationship in China’s listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of the ultimate 
controlling shareholder have a positive effect on this relationship while a divergence 
between the control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect.  
By dividing our sample into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management 
bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms, we find that cash flow rights in SOE 
controlled firms have a significant impact on accounting based pay performance and 
cash flow rights in privately controlled firms also affect the market performance based 
relationship, however, CEO pay in SAMB controlled firms bear no relationship with 
either accounting or market based performance. We therefore argue that CEO pay 
is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is 
insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling 
shareholders to maximize their profits.   
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Disproportional ownership structure and pay-performance 
relationship: evidence from China’s listed firms 
1. Introduction 
 In recent years two strands of research on the effect that ownership structure has 
on pay-performance relationship has begun to emerge. The first focused on the effects 
of cash flow rights and excess control rights on CEO pay (Masulis et al., 2009; 
Barontini and Bozzi, 2010). With US dual-class firms Masulis et al. (2009) found that 
the divergence of insider control-cash flow rights had a positive effect on CEO pay, 
while from a sample of Italian listed firms, Barontini and Bozzi (2010) acknowledged 
that there was a negative effect. The second focused the effects of different types of 
ultimate shareholders, particularly between state and non-state owned firms in a 
transition economy (Ke et al., 1999; Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006). They all 
found that the pay-performance relationship was significantly different across firms 
with alternative styles of controlling shareholders, and proved that it was determined 
by them.   
Extant research on the effects that separation of ownership and control has on firm 
performance and value is well established (Cleassens et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 
2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Masulis et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2010). Indeed it 
is common practice to have concentrated ownership and dominant shareholders in 
modern publicly traded companies where the largest shareholders exercise control 
through their voting rights despite having relatively small amounts of cash flow rights. 
The divergence between control rights and cash flow rights (excess control rights) 
gives them the ability and incentive to expropriate the wealth of other investors and 
pursue their own interests, which are often diametrically opposed to those of minority 
investors. Therefore, while the largest shareholder can mitigate agency conflict 
between shareholders and managers, it leaves the agency conflict between largest 
shareholders and minority shareholders as primarily an agency problem. This problem 
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becomes particularly severe in transition economies where ownership is concentrated 
and investors lack legal protection (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lin et al., 2010).  
There was no evidence that the separation of control and cash flow rights affected 
the pay-performance relationship, which is important for corporate governance 
because in an economy with concentrated ownership, the largest shareholders have 
strong incentives to directly monitor managers by relating CEO pay to firm 
performance (Murphy, 1999). Nevertheless, the largest shareholders will also 
maintain their private benefits by having CEO pay schemes unrelated to the wealth of 
minority shareholders. In this paper we examine the effect that ownership structure, 
specifically the cash flow rights and control rights of the largest shareholders, has on 
the pay-performance relationship in China’s listed firms. 
One key feature of these firms is that many of them are state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) carved out of former state controlled firms1. In these SOEs, controlling 
shareholders own substantial control rights in excess of their cash flow rights through 
a long principal-agent chain, a significant pyramid structure, and cross-shareholdings 
of ownership. Guided by the reform and privatization process, the state relinquished 
controls over some SOEs by either selling the shares to the public or allowing 
takeovers. Along with the IPOs of privately controlled firms since 2001, publicly 
trading SOEs have evolved into an important component of China’s listed firms. 
Since state controlled and non-state controlled firms have different operating 
objectives due to the nature of their ownership (e.g. they are subject to different 
regulations), this has had different results on the pay-performance relationship 
between them. Therefore, the Chinese context provides an excellent laboratory for us 
to examine and explain the effects of ownership structure, particularly the divergence 
between control rights and cash flow rights on the pay-performance relationship.   
Within state-controlled firms the controlling shareholders actually belong to 
different state owned entities and government agents, which means that each group 
uses a performance-based pay scheme that best suits their objectives. It was argued 
that these state controlled firms operate with multiple objectives that varied between 
                                                        
1 Privately controlled listed firms have only existed in China since 2001.  
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maximizing the wealth of shareholders, maintaining urban employment levels, and 
controlling sensitive industries (Clarke, 2003). This study only covers the early years 
of economic reform in China. To gain a clearer understanding of this issue, we 
classified state controlled firms into two types of ownership based on ultimate 
controlling shareholders, i.e., state assets management bureaus (SAMBs), and state 
owned enterprises (SOEs). SAMB is a government agency charged with managing 
and controlling state owned assets where CEOs work as representatives of the 
government, so their pay scheme may not be based on performance. One reason for 
the existence of publicly listed SOEs is to transform them into modern market 
oriented firms to maximize profitability.  
In 1985, China introduced market oriented wage reform along with other 
economic reforms in state controlled firms where general managers worked as 
bureaucrats and were paid according to the civil service pay scale. In 1985, the 
Ministry of Labor announced that CEO payment in SOEs should be linked to firm 
economic performance (the Ministry of Labor, 2000). However, this scheme did not 
provide sufficient incentive because these SOEs were still under the previous system 
where profits and wages were redistributed by the state (Yueh, 2004). With the 
establishment of two stock exchanges in the early 1990s and the State-Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003, 
the SOEs were restructured and listed on the two stock exchanges. Since 2003, many 
regulations have been promulgated by SASAC to evaluate SOEs and any existing link 
between their performance and CEO pay. Specifically, SASAC issued ‘Interim 
regulations on the evaluation of the top executive operating performance’ in SOEs 
affiliated to the central government (SOECGs) in 2003, which clearly stated that top 
executive pay should be related to total profits and sales (SASAC, 2003). Later in 
2006 and 2010 respectively, SASAC updated this regulation in those firms where 
total profits and sales are still used to measure performance (SASAC, 2006a, 2010)2, 
                                                        
2 Furthermore, in 2007 and 2008, the SASAC announced two ‘supplementary provisions’ of this regulation which 
made further efforts on relating executive pay to firm performance in SOEs (SASAC, 2007, 2008). Meanwhile, in 
2004, 2006 and 2009, the SASAC also promulgated the ‘Interim regulations on the administration of top executive 
pay in SOECGs’, ‘Interim regulations on the evaluation and administration of SOECG performance’ and ‘Interim 
regulations on the evaluation and administration of state owned financial institutions firm performance’ (SASAC, 
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by describing how to evaluate executive performance, and including a requirement 
that a CEO should resign if they fail to perform. Obviously, by putting these 
regulations into practice, SASAC has decreed that profitability be the primary 
measure of firm performance, and CEO pay is to be linked to it (SASAC, 2004, 
2006b). Meanwhile, to curtail CEO’s from expropriating shareholder wealth through 
excessive perks, SASAC also promulgated ‘Instructions on regulating top executive 
‘on-job’ consumptions in SOECGs’ in 2006 (SASAC, 2006c)3.  
These reforms and regulations of executive compensation in SOE’s are largely 
aimed at aligning the interests of shareholders and management. Extant literature 
found a positive pay-performance relationship in both SOE and privately controlled 
firms but not in SAMB controlled firms (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006, 
2007). These results confirmed that the goals of these reforms in SOEs and CEO 
compensation have only been achieved to some extent.  
In China’s weak corporate governance environment with its lack of legal 
protection for investors, the largest shareholders are facing strong incentives to 
monitor managers and operations if they are to retain their substantial cash flow rights. 
However, if their control rights exceed their cash flow rights they are likely to pursue 
their own interests and may seek to expropriate other investors by tunneling, related 
party sales, and transferring profits out of the company (Johnson et al., 2000). 
Therefore, the largest shareholders’ cash flow rights and excess control rights may 
have different effects on the pay-performance relationship. Our first hypotheses states 
that: 
• H1a: Cash flow rights have a positive effect on pay-performance 
relationship. 
• H1b: Excess control rights have a negative effect on pay-performance 
relationship. 
One important characteristic of China’s listed firms is that the majority of 
                                                                                                                                                               
2004, 2006b, 2009). 
3 At the local levels, the local SASACs located across the country have also issued regulations based on their local 
specific characteristics according to the regulations from the central SASAC. For example, Beijing SASAC 
promulgated ‘Interim regulations on the administration of top executive pay in Beijing SOEs’ in 2004, which has 
the same effects of relating CEO pay to firm performance (Beijing SASAC, 2004). 
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controlling shareholders are state-owned entities or government agents, and the shares 
they hold are not tradeable5 on the stock exchanges. As a result, these shareholders 
have an incentive to set CEO pay based on accounting-linked performance indicators 
which gives them an opportunity to expropriate other investors with more resources, 
instead of market based indicators which tend to link CEO pay with maximizing their 
wealth. Accordingly, we argue that state shareholders emphasize maximizing profits 
rather than stock return while shares in privately controlled firms held by the largest 
shareholders can be freely traded. We believe that private investors are equally likely 
to focus on market performance as well as cash flows and therefore we formulate the 
following hypotheses: 
• H2a: Cash flow rights in state controlled firms have a positive effect on 
accounting performance based pay-performance relationship, while cash 
flow rights in non-state controlled firms have a positive effect on market 
performance based pay-performance relationship. 
• H2b: Excess control rights in state controlled firms have a negative effect 
on accounting performance based pay-performance relationship, while 
excess control rights in non-state controlled firms have a negative effect on 
market performance based pay-performance relationship. 
Under China’s SASAC, SOEs are directly and ultimately controlled by both 
central and local government, where it is mandatory that state owners must receive 
cash flows, including profits and dividends, because shares of SOEs are often not 
tradable unless under the approval of the CSRC and the selling price is only at book 
value (Xu, 2003). Since 2003, CEOs of SOEs have been evaluated by a combination 
of annual performance such as return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) 
(SASAC, 2003). We therefore hypothesize that: 
• H3a: Cash flow rights have a positive effect on accounting based 
pay-performance relationship in SOEs. 
• H3b: Excess control rights have a negative effect on accounting based 
pay-performance relationship in SOEs. 
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 SAMBs4 are the agency holding state shares that are non-tradable on the market, 
they do not have cash flow rights from these shares and payouts often have to be 
remitted directly to different levels of government (Firth et al., 2006). The objectives 
of SAMB controlled firms are to carry out the instructions of the central or local 
government and to maintain local employment levels rather than maximize the value 
of a firm. In most instances CEOs in SAMB controlled firms are officials from the 
government, with little or no professional background, no rights to select other top 
executives, and no responsibility for the economic consequences (Zhang, 1998). We 
therefore hypothesize the following:  
• H4: Cash flow rights and excess control rights have no effect on 
pay-performance relationship in SAMB controlled firms. 
Our results indicate that SOEs relate CEO pay to firm accounting performance 
(return on assets and return on sales), while private controlled firms relate CEO pay to 
market performance (stock return). However, there is no relationship between CEO 
pay and firm performance in firms controlled by SAMBs. Our regression results show 
that the cash flow rights of the largest shareholders enhance the accounting 
performance related pay scheme in SOE controlled firms and improve market 
performance related pay scheme in privately controlled firms. However, the 
separation between control rights and cash flow rights shows a negative entrenchment 
effects by significantly reducing the pay-performance relationship in SOE and 
privately controlled firms. We also find that cash flow rights in SAMB controlled 
firms do not appear to affect the pay-performance relationship, which confirm the 
consensus that these firms do not really have cash flow rights because they must remit 
earnings back to their superiors (Firth et al., 2006).  
We make two major contributions to the literature. First, our research not only 
sheds light on how cash flow rights and excess control rights affect CEO pay, it also 
submits new evidence on how cash flow rights and excess control rights affect the  
                                                        
4 The term SAMB encompasses state asset management bureaus, state asset operating companies, and 
state agencies like the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture. However, SAMBs, located 
across provinces and cities, are merely agents of the central government that manage state-owned 
assets and invest them in listed firms. 
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pay-performance relationship. Cash flow rights have a positive incentive effect on the 
pay-performance relationship while excess control rights have a negative 
entrenchment effect. Second, our study furthers the understanding that different 
performance based pay schemes are used between state owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
privately controlled firms. The divergence between control rights and cash flow rights 
influences pay-performance relationship across firms with different types of ultimate 
ownership. Our evidence suggests that CEO pay in firms with the state as the 
controlling shareholder is determined by accounting based performance that is not 
sensitive to market based firm performance. This is consistent with the private 
benefits of controlling shareholders because there the CEO pay scheme is to 
maximize accounting performance to extract greater cash flows.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature; 
Section 3 outlines the data and methodology; Section 4 discusses the empirical results; 
and Section 5 presents the conclusions.  
2. Literature review 
   All extant studies document that disproportional ownership structure has two 
effects on corporate governance; the positive incentive effect of cash flow rights 
which enable the largest shareholder to monitor CEO’s efficiently, and the negative 
entrenchment effect of excess control rights which makes it easier for the largest 
shareholder to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. 
 The separation of ownership and control by the largest shareholder has been 
researched extensively, particularly the cash flow rights and control rights stemming 
from a concentration of ownership. For example, La Porta et al. (1999) argued that the 
ultimate controlling shareholders often use a pyramid structure and cross shareholding 
to obtain excessive control rights over their cash flow rights. Cash flow rights are 
found to have a positive incentive effect while the divergence between control and 
cash flow rights has a negative entrenchment effect on corporate governance 
(Claessens et al., 2002). Similar results were also provided by Lemmon and Lins 
(2003), Laeven and Levine (2008) and Gompers et al. (2010). Moreover, Johnson et al. 
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(2000) argue that managerial expropriation is an important form of tunneling which 
lowers shareholder value. Masulis et al. (2009) agreed and found a positive 
relationship between control-cash flow rights divergence and CEO pay, while 
Barontini and Bozzi (2010) found evidence from a sample of Italian listed firms that 
CEO pay was positively affected by a low divergence of control-cash flow rights. 
Other studies argued that ownership structure affects the pay-performance relationship. 
Using a sample of U.S. insurance companies from 1994 to 1996, Ke et al. (1999) 
found that managerial compensation and ROA was closely related in public-held 
insurers. With a sample of China’s listed firms between 1998 and 2002, Kato and 
Long (2005) found that state ownership weakened the pay-performance relationship. 
Firth et al. (2006) argued that firms having foreign investor or SOEs as their largest 
shareholder tended to relate CEO pay to accounting performance, whereas firms with 
a private blockholder as a dominant shareholder tended to relate CEO pay to the 
performance of the stock market.  However, these studies only focused on who the 
controlling shareholder (i.e. owner type) was and their effect on the pay-performance 
relationship, they did not explain the channel through which these effects were 
exercised.  
In this paper we fill the gap by using samples of China’s listed firms from 2002 to 
2007 to examine how and why the largest shareholder ownership structure affects the 
pay-performance relationship. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Sample  
   We compile data from every firm listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2007 because information on cash flow 
rights and control rights has only been available since 2002. Following previous 
studies, we account for the special consideration of regulated industries by eliminating 
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financial firms. PT and ST5 companies are also excluded because they might bias our 
results. Finally, we exclude observations with incomplete information on all the 
variables under analysis. The final sample consists of 1,129 firms and 6,297 firm-year 
observations from 2002 to 2007. The accounting and financial data are obtained from 
individual firm’s annual reports and the CSMAR database, and the information on 
managerial compensation, board, and ownership structure from the SinoFin database. 
CSMAR and SinoFin databases were used in several previous studies (Kato and Long, 
2005; Firth et al., 2006, 2007).   
There was ample evidence in the literature that in firms where ownership was 
highly concentrated, the largest shareholders were active in corporate governance and 
had absolute control over them. Therefore, it is essential to identify the ultimate 
controlling shareholder in order to examine the effects of ownership structure. By 
tracing through the chain of ownership we identify the ultimate controlling 
shareholder of each firm. Moreover, we classify controlling ownership into three 
types: SAMBs, SOEs and private ownership. 
3.2. Methodology 
   Within the corporate governance framework, most previous studies set up linear 
models to regress managerial compensation against firm performance and corporate 
governance variables (Core et al., 1999; Firth et al., 2006, 2007; Canarella and 
Nourayi, 2008; Cornett et al., 2008). Since this study aims to examine the effects of 
ownership structure on CEO pay, and test the relationship between managerial 
compensation and firm performance, we extend previous research by using the 
regression analyses described below.  
The first analysis examines the effect that ownership structure has on the 
pay-performance relationship across state owned and privately owned (i.e., non-state 
owned) firms:  
                                                        
5 ST stands for Special Treatment, refers to the listed firms that have already got negative net profits for three 
consecutive years who have the probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges. PT stands for Particular 
Transfer, refers to the listed firms that are suspended to be traded on the stock exchanges. These PT listed firms 
can only be traded under the approval of the stock exchanges on every Friday. 
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where i and t represent the firm and year, andεis the error terms related to 
unobservable features that explain cross sectional variations in CEO pay. PAY is the 
level of managerial compensation measured by the log of the average top three 
executive compensation levels. CASH is the cash flow rights of the controlling 
shareholders. In the additional tests we replace cash flow rights with excess control 
rights (EXCESS), defined as the difference between the control rights and cash flow 
rights of the controlling shareholders, to provide some supplementary evidence. PERF 
is firm performance, we proxy firm performance with four measures, namely the 
return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), annual stock return (RET) and Tobin’s 
Q (Q), and then regress them in separate equations. SIZE is the log of the total firm 
assets, BOARD is the log of the total number of directors on the board, POND is the 
proportion of independent directors, and LEV is the ratio of total debts to total assets. 
TENURE is the log of the CEO’s tenure with the firm as CEO, and DUALITY is a 
dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is also the board chairman and 0 otherwise. We 
also include dummy variables to control for industry and year effects. 
We modify our first regression by dividing the ownership of the largest 
shareholder between state ownership and private investors. Our second regression is 
shown as follow: 
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where PSTATE is the cash flow rights of state controlled firms. All other variables in 
the second regression are defined the same as the first regression. 
Furthermore, we extend our second regression by dividing state ownership into 
the two types discussed in Section 1: SAMBs and SOEs. The regression is as follow: 
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where PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) is the cash flow rights of different types of shareholders 
if that shareholder is the controlling shareholder. Definitions for all the variables are 
shown in Table 1. 
3.3. Measurement of variables  
   Table 1 provides definitions of the variables included in our regression models, 
whose selection is explained below. 
3.3.1 Managerial compensation 
   In China, listed firms have had to disclose their levels of managerial compensation 
in annual reports since 1998. Because these data are reported as the total of basic 
salary and bonus aggregation of the top three executives’ compensation, we base our 
empirical analysis on this information. That is, consistent with other studies on China, 
we proxy for managerial compensation using the log of the average top three 
executives’ remuneration (Kato and Long, 2005).  
3.3.2 Firm performance 
   The empirical corporate finance literature measures firm performance using both 
accounting-based performance and market based performance such as return on assets 
(Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; Kato and Kubo, 2006 and Cheng, 2008), and stock 
return (Core et al., 1999; Brick et al., 2006 and Firth et al., 2007) respectively. In 
addition, we also apply return on sales (ROS) to be robust. Therefore, we use return 
on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and annual stock return (RET) to proxy for 
firm performance in separate regressions, which is consistent with previous studies.  
   In addition to these original performance measures, we adopt industry adjusted 
measures of ROA, ROS, and RET by calculating the difference between the firm’s 
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annual ROA (ROS, RET) and the median ROA (ROS, RET) of firms in the same 
industry in the same year. We report our empirical results using industry adjusted 
measures as the main proxy for performance. We then repeat our analysis using 
Tobin’s Q (Q) as an additional measure of performance, measured as the ratio of 
market value to firm replacement value. Following Merhebi et al., (2006) and Firth et 
al., (2007), we use the lagged values of these variables in the regressions because 
CEO pay responds to a firm’s previous performance. 
3.3.3 Cash flow rights and control rights 
   To examine the effects of ultimate shareholder ownership, we calculate the cash 
flow rights and control rights by investigating the complete chain of corporate 
ownership. We define the control rights as the weakest link in the chain and cash flow 
rights as the product of ownership stakes along the chain, which is consistent with 
previous studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). For example, ultimate 
controlling shareholder firm A owns 70% shares of listed firm B, which in turn owns 
35% shares of listed firm C. We then construct that firm A controls 35% of firm C, the 
weakest link in the chain, while the cash flow right is 24.5%, the product of 70% and 
35% (70%*35%). Through a pyramid structure, cross-shareholding, and dual-class 
stocks, the largest shareholder’s control rights were always in excess of the cash flow 
rights (La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, in the additional tests, we replace cash flow 
rights with excess control rights, defined as the difference between control rights and 
cash flow rights, to provide some supportive evidence for our main hypotheses. To 
determine effective control at any intermediate as well as ultimate level, a cutoff level 
of 10% is used in all empirical analyses, which follow the argument used by 
Claessens et al. (2002).  
3.3.4 Control variables 
Firm size 
Previous studies established that CEO pay is its positive and significant relation to 
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firm size (Conyon, 1997; Core et al., 1999). Not only are larger firms more likely to 
have relatively complicated operating systems and thus be more likely to hire high 
quality CEOs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but, as documented by Chen et al. (2009) 
among others, there is a significant and positive relationship between firm size and 
firm performance in China’s listed firms. Accordingly, we use the log of total firm 
assets, SIZE, to proxy for firm size.  
Board size 
As an internal control mechanism, a board of directors is assumed to ensure that 
CEOs act in the best interests of their shareholders (Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998). 
Small boards of directors are more effective (Yermack, 1996) than large boards 
because a large number has less influence over CEOs and complicates decision 
making (Jensen, 1993). Hence, we also control board size, BOARD, defining it as the 
log of the number of directors on a board. 
Board composition 
Because independent directors have no conflicting relationship with current 
executives, they can exercise their monitoring power and make decisions 
independently (Cheng, 2008). We take this into account by defining the variable 
POND, the ratio of independent directors to all directors on the boards.  
Leverage  
Corporate capital structure is an important determinant in shaping pay for top 
executives (Basu et al., 2007; Hernan, 2007) and was also found to be linked to firm 
performance (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Chen et al., 2009), we therefore include 
the variable LEV, defined as the ratio of book value of total debts to total assets. 
CEO-Chairman duality 
Modern theory suggests that ownership and control should be separated (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) and that higher agency problems exist when the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board (Yermack, 1996). For instance, Core et al. (1999) found that 
CEOs received higher pay when they also chaired the board. We therefore include 
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CEO duality, DUALITY, as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also 
chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise.  
CEO tenure 
Although it is usual to relate CEOs’ pay to their years of experience as CEO in a 
firm (Palia, 2001), Murphy (1986) suggested that their ability was not observable at 
the time of hiring, so payment increased as they proved themselves over the years. 
However, Cornett et al. (2008) argued that top executives with little experience 
needed more time to become familiar with their firms and industries, but that top 
executives with longer tenure, although they have more career concerns, enjoyed 
better reputations and can therefore demand higher pay (Brick et al., 2006). 
Accordingly, we use the log of CEO tenure, TENURE, as a measure of CEO 
experience. 
Foreign investors 
In China, listed firms can also issue H and N shares, which can only be purchased 
by foreign investors. As outside blockholders, these foreign investors can effectively 
monitor managers using their professional knowledge. We therefore include the 
dummy variable, FOR, coded 1 if a firm has foreign investors and 0 otherwise.  
Other control variables 
The equations also include two additional dummy variables: Year, a column vector 
of a dummy variable to control the economy or market effects over time, and Industry, 
a column vector of an SIC-code based dummy variable to control variation across 
industries.6  
Table 1  
Variable definitions 
Variables Definition 
Compensation  
Managerial compensation (PAY) Log of the average top three executives’ compensation 
  
                                                        
6 We follow Firth et al. (2006) and classify firms in our sample into five groups: industrial, commercial, public 
utility, property, and conglomerate (all other industries). To avoid the dummy variable trap, we use four dummy 
variables to represent these five categories.  
 15
Firm performance  
Return on assets (ROA) Net income / total assets  
Return on sales (ROS) Net income/sales 
Stock return (RET) Annual stock return  
Tobin’s Q (Q) Market value/replacement value a
  
Ownership structure  
Cash flow rights (CASH) Cash flow rights held by the ultimate controlling shareholder
Excess control rights (EXCESS) Difference between the control rights and cash flow rights 
PSTATE Cash flow rights of state controlled firms 
PSAMB Cash flow rights of SAMB controlled firms 
PSOE Cash flow rights of SOE controlled firms 
PPRI Cash flow rights of privately controlled firms 
  
Firm and CEO characteristics  
Firm size (SIZE) Log of total assets 
Board size (BOARD) Log of total directors on board  
Board composition (POND) Independent directors/total directors  
Leverage (LEV) Total debts/total assets in book value 
CEO-chair duality (DUALITY) Equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
CEO tenure (TENURE) Log of years the CEO has been this position 
Foreign investor (FOR) Equal to 1 if the firm has foreign investors 
  
Other variables  
Industry (Industry) b Equal to 1 for the specific industry 
Year (Year) Equal to 1 for the specific year 
a Market value is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt; 
replacement value is measured using the book value of total assets. 
b We create four dummy variables to represent the five groups of listed firms borrowed from Firth et al. 
(2006): industrial, commercial, public utility, property, and conglomerate (all other industries). 
3.4. Sample statistics 
   The first section of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on managerial 
compensation, firm performance, and firm and CEO characteristics, averaged across 
2002 to 2007 for the entire sample. Panels A, B, and C in this table report detailed 
statistics for managerial compensation in these firms based on years, industries, and 
dominant shareholders. The means (medians) in Panel A indicate a steady 151.72% 
(164.81%) increase in CEO pay across our sample period, ranging from 131,023RMB 
(95,666RMB) in 2002 to 329,811RMB (253,333RMB) in 2007. Nonetheless, these 
pay levels were much lower than those reported in research for the U.S., U.K., and 
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other countries (Core et al., 1999; Brick et al., 2006; Merhebi et al., 2006; Kato et al., 
2007; Basu et al., 2007), a pay level gap that may be attributable to smaller firms, 
higher rates of CEO turnover, and/or lack of long term incentives7 (Firth et al., 2002; 
Kato and Long, 2005).  
After identifying three types of firms by ownership (i.e., a SAMB, SOE or private 
investors as the controlling shareholder), we find that CEO pay varies across 
industries and firms according to the different types of dominant shareholder (see 
Table 2). For example, the mean (median) of CEO pay in commercial industry was 
236,011RMB (178,683RMB), whereas the mean (median) of CEO pay in property 
industry was 339,343RMB (230,000RMB). Likewise, the mean (median) for SAMB 
controlled firms was 177,740RMB (129,333RMB), whereas the mean (median) for 
SOE controlled firms was 241,229RMB (190,400RMB).  
Table 2  
Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std. Dev.  
Compensation  
CEO average pay  219,939 160,000 6,666 470,6667 75,649 
Firm performance 
Return on assets (ROA) % 2.26 2.64 -168.26 46.31 8.49 
Return on sales (ROS) % -0.043 0.039 -83.69 46.63 1.87 
Stock return (RET) % 39.69 -3.96 -90.93 1611.78 104.68 
Tobin’s Q (Q) 1.16 0.96 0.13 23.44 0.76 
Ownership structure      
Cash flow rights (CASH) 34.41 32.17 0.51 100 18.11 
Excess control rights(EXCESS)a 6.38 0 0 70.56 9.06 
Firm characteristic 
Assets (millions) 3940 1770 27.3 719000 17600 
Board size (BOARD) 9.76 9 4 23 2.20 
Board composition (POND) 3.13 3 0 10 0.94 
Capital structure (LEV) % 49.71 50.25 0.02 1037.51 25.87 
CEO characteristic 
CEO duality (DUALITY) 0.11 0 0 1 0.31 
CEO tenure (TENURE) 2.55 2 0.08 12.42 1.85 
                                                        
7 Long-term incentive schemes were rare in China’s listed firms accounting for less than 5% of the total listed 
firms, and stock options and restricted stocks have only been available to top executives since the end of 2006. For 
example, since 2006, there were 161 listed firms who exercised stock options. Until the end of 2009, this number 
decreased to 99 and then only 47 by the end of June 2010. Because of data limitation, we still use cash 
compensation in this study.   
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Panel A: Compensation based on year 
2002 131,023 95,666 6,666 1,575,308 122,442 
2003 170,329 126,666 7,666 1,628,234 153,738 
2004 212,776 160,379 10,266 3,210,000 213,192 
2005 218,176 167,633 8,966 2,726,667 205,604 
2006 253,069 196,666 12,000 3,740,000 243,939 
2007 329,811 253,333 166,66 470,6667 315,655 
Panel B: Compensation based on industry 
Industrial  202,353 140,333 7,200 3,486,567 209,495 
Commercial  236,011 178,683 13,666 1,309,300 203,546 
Public utility 245,134 202,383 11,424 1,848,030 204,141 
Property  339,343 230,000 12,566 4,706,667 485,295 
Conglomerate  231,535 185,870 6,666 1,707,057 194,260 
Panel C: Compensation based on ownership 
SAMB 177,740 129,333 9,246 1,225,333 160,800 
SOE 241,229 190,400 7,200 4,706,667 212,011 
PRIVATE 211,333 146,966 6,666 1,792,933 210,226 
The figures in Panel A are the average of six years from 2002 to 2007. 
The figures for all the value variables are in China’s currency, RMB. 
a Excess control is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash flow rights of the 
ultimate controlling shareholder, which is consistent with Claessens et al. (2002). This information is 
only available in the listed firms’ annual reports since 2002. 
Table 3  
Test of differences in means and medians based on ownership 
SAMB vs. SOE SAMB vs. PRIVATE SOE vs. PRIVATE 
-6.52*** a -3.82*** a 4.86*** a
-9.34*** b -3.81*** b -7.17*** b
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
a t-value from the t-test of differences in means. 
b z-value from the Mann-Whitney U-test of differences in medians. 
Table 3 reports the significance of differences in means and medians of CEO pay 
between the groups. For example, the t-statistic (z-statistic) of -6.52 (-9.34) in the 
comparison of SAMB versus SOE shows that the mean (median) CEO pay was 
significantly higher for SOE controlled firms than SAMB controlled firms. These 
results can be summarized as follows: the negative t-statistics in the comparisons of 
SAMB versus all the other owner types indicate that CEOs in SAMB controlled firms 
received lower payments, while the positive t-statistics in the comparisons of SOE 
versus all the other owner types suggest that CEOs in SOE controlled firms received 
the highest payment among all types of listed firms.   
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Pearson correlations  
As Table 4 shows, the Pearson correlations between each pair of variables 
(contemporaneous value) are lower, which indicates that multi-collinearity does not 
exist.  
Table 4 
Key variables: Pearson correlation matrix 
 ROA ROS RET Q SIZE LEV BOARD POND
ROA 1         
ROS 0.3005 1       
RET 0.1939  0.0401 1       
Q -0.0713 -0.0494 0.5153  1      
SIZE 0.2443  0.0842 0.1836  -0.1651 1     
LEV -0.5270 -0.1539 0.0291  0.3044  0.0790 1    
BOARD 0.0596  0.0296 -0.0298 -0.0768 0.2126 0.0003  1   
POND 0.0272  0.0077 0.1798  0.0894  0.0055 0.0536  -0.2555  1  
ROA is firm return on assets (net income divided by total assets); ROS is firm return on sales (net 
income divided by total sales). RET is firm stock return; Q is defined as the ratio of market value to 
firm replacement value; SIZE is log of total firm assets; LEV is the= ratio of total debts to total assets; 
BOARD is the log of total number of directors on the boards; POND is the proportion of independent 
directors on the board/ratio of the number of independent directors to total number of directors.   
4.2. Empirical results 
As shown in Table 5, which presents the results for Equation (1) broken out by 
different firm performance measures, the lagged industry-adjusted ROA, ROS, RET 
and Tobin’s Q are positively and significantly associated with CEO pay. This result 
suggests that top executives tend to be paid more in firms that perform well in the 
market, or have higher corporate value. While this result supports our hypotheses, 
albeit the significantly positive effect of stock return is inconsistent with findings by 
Firth et al. (2007) who argued that market performance does not provide an incentive 
to general CEOs8. For example, the coefficient on industry adjusted ROA indicates 
                                                        
8 Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 1998 to 2000, Firth et al. (2007) find no relationship between CEO 
pay and market performance.  
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that one unit increase in industry adjusted ROA lead to a 36.34% increase in CEO pay 
level (column 1). 
The negative coefficients of CASH (see Table 5) provide evidence that CEO pay 
is lower in firms where the largest shareholders have higher cash flow rights, and the 
coefficients are significant. Moreover, all the interaction terms used to test whether 
ownership is associated with performance based pay for CEOs are positive and 
significant, except CASH*RETt-1. This finding not only suggests  that when deciding 
on CEO pay, state owned firms give more weight to profitability and value, it also 
shows that, in support of Hypotheses 1, cash flow rights have a positive incentive 
effect on the pay-performance relationship.  
In line with previous studies (Conyon, 1997; Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; Girma 
et al., 2007), our results also show that larger firms paid their managers higher salaries, 
and with Basu et al.’s (2007) finding of a significantly negative effect of firm leverage, 
managerial compensation is negatively related to leverage, that is, firms with higher 
debt pay their managers less. This latter effect may be attributable to debt being seen 
as monitoring by external debt holders (John and John, 1993). 
Table 5 
Regression results of cash flow rights effects on CEO pay 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant  6.028***(19.46) 5.500***(17.76) 5.598***(17.30) 4.962***(16.41)
CASH -0.007***(-9.02) -0.006***(-8.51) -0.005***(-6.83) -0.003***(-3.70)
ROAt-1 1.979***(4.28)    
ROSt-1  0.018(0.15)   
RETt-1   0.183***(3.64)  
Qt-1    0.309***(3.94) 
CASH*ROAt-1 0.034***(2.81)    
CASH*ROSt-1  0.016***(4.68)   
CASH*RETt-1   0.002(1.24)  
CASH*Qt-1    0.005**(2.04) 
SIZE 0.256***(17.92) 0.284***(20.01) 0.280***(18.81) 0.317***(23.03)
BOARD 0.228***(3.79) 0.217***(3.57) 0.221***(3.46) 0.215***(3.56) 
POND 0.553***(2.84) 0.550**(2.79) 0.501**(2.41) 0.398**(2.03) 
LEV 0.031(0.57) -0.097*(-1.77) -0.168***(-3.37) -0.234***(-4.85)
DUALITY 0.078*(1.95) 0.071*(1.77) 0.059(1.38) 0.061(1.53) 
TENURE 0.067***(5.05) 0.076***(5.69) 0.078***(5.63) 0.075***(5.65) 
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FOR 0.377***(8.46) 0.364***(8.06) 0.368***(7.80) 0.349***(7.82) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.2408 0.2217 0.2295 0.2336 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Firm performance is measured by four variables: 
ROA, ROS, RET and Q. We apply the industry-adjusted firm performance in the regressions. CASH is 
the cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. SIZE, BOARD, POND, LEV, TENURE, 
DUALITY and FOR are measured as in Table 1.  
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are given in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variables such as the size of a board and number of independent directors have a 
positive impact on managerial compensation. This interesting result contrasts directly 
with Conyon and Peck (1998) and Firth et al. (2007), who found a negative effect of 
the size of a board and an insignificant effect of the proportion of independent 
directors. Our results, however, are consistent with the evidence that small boards are 
more effective (Yermack, 1996) and large boards have a more doubtful influence on 
CEOs (Jensen, 1993). It also suggests that the proportion of independent directors is 
coming into line with the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) 
mandate that at least one third of board directors, who set CEO pay, should be 
independent. 
 We also find no relationship between duality and CEO pay, which is similar to 
Conyon’s (1997) analysis of British firms, but contrary Core et al.’s (1999) findings 
that duality in U.S firms lead to higher CEO pay. We do note a positive relationship 
between CEO tenure and CEO pay, which is not only consistent with most previous 
studies (Brick et al., 2006; Cornett et al., 2008) but echoes the intuitive assumption of 
a relationship between CEO pay and years of experience (Palia, 2001). Interestingly, 
in line with our conjecture, we also find that CEOs receive higher payment if a firm 
has foreign investors. 
Table 6 reports the regression results for Equation (2) with a primary focus on the 
ownership coefficients and interaction terms. A close examination of the interaction 
terms also reveals some interesting outcomes. They are positive when we use 
profitability to measure performance but are negative when performance is measured 
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as stock return and firm value. This result shows that SOEs put great emphasis on 
profitability while privately controlled firms care more about market performance. In 
fact, during the period of this study, SOEs achieved a higher average growth in 
operating sales, which supports Hypotheses 2a. However, the coefficients are only 
marginally significant for CASH*ROSt-1, and insignificant for other terms, so we 
divide state ownership into two types of firms where the ultimate controlling 
shareholder is SAMB and SOE, respectively, and run the regression (3). 
Table 6  
Regression results of cash flow rights of state and non-state controlled firms 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant 5.992***(19.34) 5.506***(17.71) 5.589***(17.27) 4.893***(16.18) 
CASH -0.006***(-8.73) -0.006***(-8.08) -0.005***(-6.76) -0.005***(-6.40) 
ROAt-1 3.168***(11.20)    
ROSt-1  0.520***(6.35)   
RETt-1   0.232***(8.48)  
Qt-1    0.442***(9.27) 
PSTATE*ROAt-1 0.025(1.18)    
PSTATE*ROSt-1  0.012*(1.70)   
PSTATE*RETt-1   -0.001(-0.43)  
PSTATE*Qt-1    -0.001(-0.02) 
Size 0.257***(18.02) 0.283***(19.86) 0.280***(18.83) 0.317***(23.01) 
Board 0.223***(3.71) 0.208***(3.43) 0.221***(3.47) 0.217***(3.61) 
Pond 0.557***(2.86) 0.552**(2.79) 0.497**(2.39) 0.406**(2.07) 
Lev 0.048(0.92) -0.042(-0.78) -0.164***(-3.32) -0.233***(-4.82) 
Duality 0.076*(1.91) 0.068*(1.68) 0.057(1.34) 0.061(1.52) 
Tenure 0.067***(5.01) 0.077***(5.70) 0.077***(5.60) 0.075***(5.61) 
For 0.373***(8.37) 0.360***(7.97) 0.368***(7.80) 0.347***(7.75) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjust R2 0.2393 0.2171 0.2292 0.2324 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. CASH is the cash flow rights of the ultimate 
controlling shareholder. PSTATE represents the cash flow rights of state controlled firms. All other 
variables are defined the same as those in previous tables. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
The estimation results of regression (3) are given in Table 7, where we apply the 
controlling shareholder cash flow rights to measure the ownership structure. Table 7 
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reports generally negative coefficients on cash flow rights regardless of performance 
measures which indicate that cash flow rights will reduce the level of CEO pay.  
More importantly, we focus on the interaction terms. These terms are positive when 
firm performance is measured by ROA and ROS and are statistically significant for 
SOE controlled firms. The results indicate that CEO pay is related to profitability and 
the cash flow rights of SOEs enhance the pay-performance relationship in SOE 
controlled firms, which is consistent with our hypothesis 3a. The coefficients are 
economically significant. For example, in column 1 of Table 7, the coefficient of 
PSOE*ROAt-1 indicates that a 1% increase in SOE cash flow rights lead to a 3.2% 
increase in pay-performance sensitivity. The interaction terms with stock return 
measures of performance are positive and only significant when firms have private 
investors as the controlling shareholders. This result is consistent with our conjecture 
2a that a private controller is more likely to relate CEO pay to market performance, 
and again we find evidence that cash flow rights have positive incentive effects on 
corporate governance. However, the interaction terms of SAMB controlled firms are 
insignificant, which is consistent with Hypotheses 4. The estimated coefficients on 
control variables are similar with those reported in Table 5 and 6. 
Table 7 
Regression results of cash flow rights across three types of firms 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant 6.028***(19.45) 5.518***(17.79) 5.597***(17.29) 4.705***(10.26)
CASH -0.007***(-9.03) -0.006***(-8.50) -0.005***(-6.83) -0.002**(-2.12) 
ROAt-1 2.139***(4.38)    
ROSt-1  0.079(0.52)   
RETt-1   0.181***(3.57)  
Qt-1    0.073(1.21) 
PSAMB*ROAt-1 0.021(0.85)    
PSOE*ROAt-1 0.032**(2.68)    
PPRI*ROAt-1 0.015(0.56)    
PSAMB*ROSt-1  0.012(1.58)   
PSOE*ROSt-1  0.015***(4.33)   
PPRI*ROSt-1  0.009(1.15)   
PSAMB*RETt-1   0.002(0.53)  
PSOE*RETt-1   0.002(1.18)  
PPRI*RETt-1   0.002*(1.78)  
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PSAMB*Qt-1    0.008(1.60) 
PSOE*Qt-1    0.005**(2.46) 
PPRI*Qt-1    0.009**(1.96) 
SIZE 0.256***(17.91) 0.283***(19.89) 0.280***(18.81) 0.317***(15.35)
BOARD 0.227***(3.78) 0.216***(3.52) 0.221**(3.46) 0.158*(1.88) 
POND 0.556***(2.85) 0.549***(2.78) 0.501*(2.41) 0.735**(2.89) 
LEV 0.030(0.58) -0.084(-1.50) -0.168(-3.37) -0.182*(-1.86) 
TENURE 0.067***(5.05) 0.076***(5.66) 0.078***(5.63) 0.085***(6.00) 
FOR 0.375***(8.42) 0.363***(8.05) 0.368***(7.80) 0.332***(5.17) 
DUALITY 0.078*(1.95) 0.072*(1.78) 0.059(1.38) 0.082(1.43) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.2410 0.2219 0.2295 0.1927 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the cash flow rights of each type of controlling shareholder. All the 
other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
In order to provide some supplementary evidence and disentangle the incentive 
and entrenchment effects of the largest shareholder, we repeat our analyses of 
regression (1) to (3) by replacing cash flow rights (CASH) with ultimate controlling 
shareholder excess control rights (EXCESS). The results are shown in Table 8 to 10. 
Our primary focus is on the interaction terms between ownership and performance. 
The general results show negative coefficients for most interaction terms which 
helped support Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b, that deviation between control rights and 
cash flow rights have negative entrenchment effects on corporate governance, which 
is reflected by a weaker pay-performance relationship. We obtain opposite results 
when excess control rights are used instead of cash flow rights. These results are 
broadly consistent with previous studies on the separation of ownership and control 
(La Porta et al., 1999; Cleassens et al., 2002). Meanwhile, we find there is a positive 
relationship between CEO pay and excess control rights, which is consistent with the 
argument that it is easier for a CEO to expropriate wealth where corporate governance 
is weak, reflected by a higher divergence between control rights and cash flow rights 
(Core et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). 
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Table 8 
Regression results of excess control rights effects on CEO pay 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant  6.160***(19.67) 5.665***(18.09) 6.049***(19.70) 5.202***(17.16)
EXCESS 0.003**(2.14) 0.003**(2.37) 0.002(1.32) 0.001(0.30) 
ROAt-1 3.085***(9.73)    
ROSt-1  0.503***(5.68)   
RETt-1   0.255***(11.80)  
Qt-1    0.565***(11.07)
EXCESS*ROAt-1 -0.034(-1.26)    
EXCESS*ROSt-1  -0.012*(-1.51)   
EXCESS*RETt-1   -0.005**(-2.53)  
EXCESS*Qt-1    -0.012***(-3.02)
SIZE 0.232***(16.48) 0.259***(18.53) 0.247***(18.18) 0.296***(21.99)
BOARD 0.261***(4.29) 0.248***(4.02) 0.266***(4.40) 0.242***(4.00) 
POND 0.650***(3.30) 0.629***(3.16) 0.498**(2.55) 0.451**(2.29) 
LEV 0.071(1.35) -0.019(-0.35) -0.125**(-2.60) -0.209***(-4.34)
DUALITY 0.072***(5.38) 0.082***(6.03) 0.075***(5.64) 0.079***(5.93) 
TENURE 0.106**(2.63) 0.095**(2.34) 0.086**(2.15) 0.078**(1.96) 
FOR 0.391***(8.67) 0.374***(8.21) 0.395***(8.83) 0.366***(8.16) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.2227 0.2028 0.2320 0.2262 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Firm performance is measured by four variables: 
ROA, ROS, RET and Q. We apply the industry-adjusted firm performance in the regressions. EXCESS 
is the excess control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. SIZE, BOARD, POND, LEV, 
TENURE, DUALITY and FOR are measured as in Table 1.  
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are given in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 9 
Regression results of excess control rights of state and non-state controlled firms 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant 6.167***(19.69) 5.647***(18.05) 5.802***(17.88) 5.141***(16.97) 
EXCESS 0.003**(2.04) 0.003**(2.33) 0.003**(2.24) 0.003*(1.64) 
ROAt-1 2.996***(10.74)    
ROSt-1  0.521***(6.64)   
RETt-1   0.264***(9.55)  
Qt-1    0.513***(11.15) 
PSTATE*ROAt-1 0.046(1.34)    
PSTATE*ROSt-1  0.029**(2.72)   
PSTATE*RETt-1   0.005(1.51)  
PSTATE*Qt-1    0.007*(1.93) 
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Size 0.233***(16.49) 0.261***(18.62) 0.256***(17.67) 0.298***(22.10) 
Board 0.258***(4.24) 0.248***(4.04) 0.246***(3.83) 0.246***(4.05) 
Pond 0.655***(3.33) 0.655***(3.28) 0.599**(2.87) 0.459**(2.33) 
Lev 0.063(1.18) -0.051(-0.92) -0.136**(-2.74) -0.211***(-4.37) 
Duality 0.104**(2.60) 0.096**(2.38) 0.078*(1.82) 0.077*(1.94) 
Tenure 0.072***(5.39) 0.083***(6.09) 0.081***(5.87) 0.079***(5.91) 
For 0.391***(8.69) 0.378***(8.30) 0.388***(8.17) 0.365***(8.13) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjust R2 0.2228 0.2041 0.2192 0.2249 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. EXCESS is the excess control rights of the 
ultimate controlling shareholder. PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the excess control rights of 
each type of controlling shareholder. All other variables are defined the same as those in previous 
tables. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 10 
Regression results of excess control rights across three types of firms 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Constant 6.163***(19.67) 5.673***(18.12) 5.799***(17.87) 5.248***(17.26) 
EXCESS 0.003**(2.07) 0.003**(2.18) 0.003**(2.30) 0.003**(2.11) 
ROAt-1 3.080***(9.71)    
ROSt-1  0.527***(5.90)   
RETt-1   0.279***(9.27)  
Qt-1    0.568***(11.09) 
PSAMB*ROAt-1 -0.048(-0.59)    
PSOE*ROAt-1 -0.015(-0.41)    
PPRI*ROAt-1 -0.050*(-1.88)    
PSAMB*ROSt-1  -0.010(-1.07)   
PSOE*ROSt-1  -0.020(-1.32)   
PPRI*ROSt-1  -0.029**(-2.61)   
PSAMB*RETt-1   -0.002(-0.13)  
PSOE*RETt-1   -0.006(-1.42)  
PPRI*RETt-1   -0.006*(-1.73)  
PSAMB*Qt-1    -0.038(-0.18) 
PSOE*Qt-1    -0.017***(-2.91) 
PPRI*Qt-1    -0.010**(-2.61) 
SIZE 0.233***(16.48) 0.259***(18.52) 0.257***(17.68) 0.294***(21.81) 
BOARD 0.260***(4.28) 0.247***(4.01) 0.245***(3.81) 0.243***(4.01) 
POND 0.651***(3.30) 0.650***(3.26) 0.596***(2.86) 0.413**(2.10) 
LEV 0.065(1.22) -0.044(-0.79) -0.135**(-2.71) -0.205***(-4.25) 
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TENURE 0.072***(5.38) 0.082***(6.01) 0.082***(5.91) 0.079***(5.95) 
DUALITY 0.106**(2.63) 0.097**(2.40) 0.078*(1.84) 0.084**(2.10) 
FOR 0.390***(8.65) 0.375***(8.23) 0.388***(8.19) 0.369***(8.22) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.2229 0.2049 0.2197 0.2284 
Obs 3286 3286 3286 3286 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the excess control 
rights of each type of controlling shareholder. All the other variables are defined the same as those in 
previous tables. 
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.3. Endogeneity problem 
   Because endogeneity was one potential problem for this study, in our regressions 
we consider firm performance an exogenous variable that, together with other 
explanatory variables, has an explanatory impact on managerial compensation. 
However, because firm performance can still be seen as an endogenous variable and a 
function of other firm-specific characteristics, we check the robustness of the results 
by estimating our three regressions using 2SLS. In the first stage we use an OLS 
model to obtain the fitted values of firm performance by regressing it on a set of 
lagged control variables in regression (1). In the second stage the fitted values are 
used in place of the firm performance in regressions that are the same as those 
reported in Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7. The general results are similar to those 
shown in previous tables but for the sake of brevity we only report the results of the 
first regression in Tables 11.   
Table 11 
2SLS estimation of regression (1) 
Dependent variable: managerial compensation 
Panel A: 2SLS estimation results of regression (1) 
Constant  6.098***(17.10) 5.450***(16.83) 7.388***(16.94) 5.022***(16.10)
CASH -0.006**(-2.32) -0.007***(-2.71) -0.013***(-2.74) -0.008***(-2.05)
ROAt-1 1.369***(3.79)    
ROSt-1  0.053**(2.04)   
RETt-1   0.175***(6.36)  
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Qt-1    0.259(0.07) 
CASH*ROAt-1 0.169*(1.94)    
CASH*ROSt-1  0.052**(2.03)   
CASH*RETt-1   0.051***(4.38)  
CASH*Qt-1    0.012*(1.69) 
SIZE 0.246***(13.97) 0.274***(18.18) 0.190***(10.41) 0.297***(19.07)
BOARD 0.198***(3.68) 0.187***(3.50) 0.241***(4.44) 0.185***(3.57) 
POND 0.763***(4.61) 0.760***(4.55) 0.441**(2.43) 0.758***(4.45) 
LEV 0.091(1.36) -0.077(-1.24) -0.081*(-1.70) -0.144***(-3.06)
DUALITY 0.098***(2.81) 0.091**(2.57) 0.089**(2.22) 0.081**(2.44) 
TENURE 0.077***(6.25) 0.086***(7.24) 0.068***(4.47) 0.095***(7.40) 
FOR 0.377***(9.66) 0.364***(9.07) 0.428***(9.99) 0.349***(8.72) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included  Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.2012 0.1829 0.1215 0.1775 
Obs 4895 4895 4895 4895 
Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Firm performance is measured by four variables: 
ROA, ROS, RET and Q. We apply  the industry-adjusted firm performance in the regressions. All the 
other variables are measured as in Table 5.  
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are given in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
   We repeat the analyses by winsorizing the top and bottom 1% of the CEO pay 
variable to excluding any influence from the outliers, and the results are broadly 
consistent with those shown in the previous tables. All firm performance coefficients 
are positive and significant. More important, the interaction terms between cash flow 
rights and firm performance are all positive and PSOE*ROAt-1, PSOE*ROSt-1 and 
PPRI*RETt-1 are statistically significant. 
5. Conclusion  
   China’s ongoing economic reform and corporate restructuring, which focuses 
primarily on improving management, is accelerating the corporatization of traditional 
SOEs. CEO and top manager’s incentives, being the central theme in such reform, are 
poorly understood. We therefore take advantage of data produced since the 2002 
mandate that listed firms in China disclose the largest shareholder cash flow rights 
and control rights in their annual reports to examine the effects on the relationship 
between managerial compensation and firm performance.  
Our empirical results show that cash flow rights in the hands of the ultimate 
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controlling shareholder have an incentive effect on the pay-performance relationship. 
In particular, the higher cash flow rights can better align CEO pay with firm 
profitability in SOEs, and stock return in privately controlled firms. We also provide 
similar evidence to Claessens et al. (2002), that divergence between control rights and 
cash flow rights have negative entrenchment effects on the pay-performance 
relationship. These observations suggest that the development of a market economy in 
China has important implications for CEO pay. 
In the Chinese context, we examine the pay-performance relationship in firms 
where different types of controlling owners have dissimilar objectives and 
motivations. Our multivariate analysis results show that the pay-performance scheme 
has been effective in SOE and privately controlled firms, albeit depending on different 
performance measures. In SOEs, CEO pay is linked to firm accounting performance 
(ROA and ROS). This is consistent with controlling state owners whose shares are 
non-tradable but who are entitled to cash flows. In privately controlled firms, however, 
CEO pay is sensitive to market performance, which is consistent with literature on US 
firms.  
   Overall, our study results indicate that ownership structure and types of 
controlling shareholders have jointly affected the CEO pay-performance relationship. 
Therefore, to better understand the causes and consequences of CEO compensation, 
future studies should focus on the unique characteristics of the institutional 
environment, such as corporate governance and ownership structure.  
 29
References 
Barnhart, S.W., Rosenstein, S., 1998. Board composition, managerial ownership, and firm    
performance: An empirical analysis. Financial Review 33(4), 1–16. 
Barontini, R., Bozzi, S., 2010. CEO compensation and performance in family firms. Working paper. 
Basu, S., Hwang, L.S., Mitsudome, T., Weintrop, J., 2007. Corporate governance, top executive 
compensation and firm performance in Japan. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 15(1), 56–79. 
Brick, I.E., Palmon, O., Waid, J.K., 2006. CEO compensation, director compensation, and firm 
performance: Evidence of cronyism? Journal of Corporate Finance 12(3), 403–423. 
Canarella, G.M., Nourayi, M., 2008. Executive compensation and firm performance: Adjustment 
dynamics, non-linearity and asymmetry. Managerial and Decision Economics 29(4), 293–315. 
Chen, G., Firth, M., Xu, L.P., 2009. Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China’s 
listed companies. Journal of Banking and Finance 33(1), 171–181. 
Cheng, S., 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial 
Economics 87(1), 157–176. 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Joseph, P. H. F., Lang, L. H. P., 2002. Disentangling the incentive and 
entrenchment effects of largest shareholdings. Journal of Finance 57(6), 2741-2771. 
Clarke, D.C., 2003. Corporate governance in China: An overview. China Economic Review 14(4), 
494–507. 
Conyon, M.J., 1997. Corporate governance and executive compensation. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 15(4), 493–509. 
Conyon, M.J., Peck, S.I., 1998. Board control, remuneration committees, and top management 
compensation. Academy of Management Journal 41(2), 146–157. 
Core, J.E., Holthausen. R.W., Larcker, D.F., 1999. Corporate governance, chief executive officer 
compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 51(3), 371–406. 
Cornett, M.M., Marcus. A.J., Tehranian, H., 2008. Corporate governance and pay-for-performance: The 
impact of earnings management. Journal of Financial Economics 87(2), 357–373. 
Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. Ownership structure and corporate performance. Journal of 
Corporate Finance 7(3), 209-233.   
Dewenter, K.L., Malatesta, P.H., 2001. State-owned and privately owned firms: An empirical analysis 
of profitability, leverage, and labor intensity. American Economic Review 91(1), 320–334. 
Firth, M., Fung, P., Rui, O.M., 2002. Firm performance, governance structure, and top management 
turnover in a transitional economy. Working paper, Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
Firth, M., Fung, P.M.Y., Rui, O.M., 2006. Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China.  
Journal of Corporate Finance 12(4), 693–714. 
Firth, M., Fung, P.M.Y., Rui, O.M., 2007. How ownership and corporate governance influence chief 
executive pay in China's listed firms. Journal of Business Research 60(7), 776–785. 
Girma, S., Thompson, S., Wright, P.W., 2007. Corporate governance reforms and executive 
compensation determination: Evidence from the U.K. The Manchester School 75(1), 65–81. 
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., Metrick, A., 2010. Extreme governance: an analysis of dual-class firms in the 
United States. Review of Financial Studies 23(3), 1051-1088. 
Groves, T., Hong, Y., Mcmillan, J., Naughton, B., 1994. Autonomy and incentives in Chinese state 
enterprises. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(1), 183–209. 
 30
Hermalin, B.E., Wallace, N.E., 2001. Firm performance and executive compensation in the savings and 
loan industry. Journal of Financial Economics 61(1), 139–170. 
Hernan., O.M., 2007. Executive compensation and capital structure: the effect of convertible debt and 
straight debt on CEO pay. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43(1), 69–93. 
Jensen, M., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. 
Journal of Finance 48 (2), 831–880.  
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3(4), 305–360. 
Jensen, M.C., Murphy, K.J., 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of 
Political Economy 98(2), 225–264. 
John, T.A., John, K., 1993. Top-management compensation and capital structure. Journal of Finance 
48(3), 949-–974. 
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2000. Tunneling. American Economic 
Review 90(2), 22-27. 
Kato, T., Kim, W., Lee, J.H., 2007. Executive compensation, firm performance, and chaebols in Korea: 
Evidence from new panel data. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 15(1), 36–55. 
Kato, T., Kubo, K., 2006. CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel 
data on individual CEO pay. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 20(1), 1–19. 
Kato, T., Long, C., 2005. Executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in 
China: Evidence from firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 54(4), 39–81. 
Ke, B., Petroni, K., Safieddine, A., 1999. Ownership concentration and sensitivity of executive pay to 
accounting performance measures: evidence from publicly and privately-held insurance companies. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 28(2), 185-209. 
La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of 
Finance 54(2), 471-518. 
La Porta, R., Lopes-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2000. Investor protection and corporate 
governance. Journal of Financial Economics 58(1), 3-27. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2002. Investor protection and corporate 
valuation. Journal of Finance 57(3), 1147-1170. 
Laeven, L., Levine, R., 2008. Complex ownership structures and corporate valuations. Review of 
Financial Studies 21(2), 579-604. 
Lemmon, M. L., Lins, K., 2003. Ownership structure, corporate governance and firm value: evidence 
from the east asian financial crisis. Journal of Finance 58(4), 1445-1468. 
Lin, C., Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., Xuan, Y., 2010. Ownership structure and cost of corporate borrowing. 
Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming. 
Masulis, R., W., Wang, C., Xie, F., 2009. Agency problems at dual-class companies. Journal of Finance 
64(4), 1697-1727. 
Merhebi, R., Pattenden, K., Swan, P.L., Zhou, X.M., 2006. Australian chief executive officer 
remuneration: Pay and performance. Accounting and Finance 46(3), 481–497. 
The Ministry of Labor, 2000. Overview of the current situation of enterprise wage structure in China. 
Ministry of Labor. 
Murphy, K.J., 1986. Incentives, learning, and compensation: a theoretical and empirical investigation 
of managerial labor contracts. Rand Journal of Economics 17(1), 59-76. 
 31
Murphy, K.J., 1999. Executive compensation. In O. Ashenfelter, D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor 
Economics, North-Holland, Amsterdam, vol. 3. p. 2485-2563. 
Palia, D., 2001. The endogeneity of managerial compensation in firm valuation: A solution. Review of 
Financial Studies 14(3), 735–764. 
SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), 2003. 
Interim regulations on the evaluation of the SOE affiliated to the central government top executive 
operating performance.  
Beijing SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council), 2004. Interim regulations on the administration of top executive pay in Beijing SOEs. 
SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), 2004. 
Interim regulations on the administration of top executive pay in SOEs affiliated to the central 
government. 
SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), 
2006a. Interim regulations on the evaluation of the SOE affiliated to the central government top 
executive operating performance. 
SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), 
2006b. Interim regulations on the evaluation and administration of SOE affiliated to the central 
government performance. 
SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), 
2006c. Instructions on regulating top executive ‘on-job’ consumption in SOEs affiliated to central 
government. 
SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), 2007. 
Interim regulations on the evaluation of the SOE affiliated to the central government top executive 
operating performance: supplementary provisions. 
SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), 2008. 
Interim regulations on the evaluation of the SOE affiliated to the central government top executive 
operating performance: supplementary provisions. 
SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), 2009. 
Interim regulation on the evaluation and administration of state owned financial institutions firm 
performance. 
SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council), 2010. 
Interim regulations on the evaluation of the SOE affiliated to the central government top executive 
operating performance. 
Shleifer, A., 1998. State versus private ownership. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(4), 133–150. 
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52(2), 737–783.  
White, H., 1980. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for 
heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48(4): 817-838. 
Xu, L., 2003. Control transfers, privatization, and corporate performance: efficiency gains in China’s 
listed companies. Working Paper. Zhongshan University. 
Yermack, D., 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of 
Financial Economics 40(2), 185–211. 
Yueh, L.Y., 2004. Wage reforms in China during the 1990s. Asian Economic Journal 18(2), 149–164. 
Zhang, W.Y., 1998. China’s SOE reform: A corporate governance perspective. Working Paper, Peking 
University.  
 32
